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NOTES
An Attack on the Texas School Financing System:
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District
A suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas school financing system
was filed originally in 1968 by a group of Mexican-American public school
children and their taxpaying parents in the Edgewood Independent School
District in San Antonio, Texas.' The plaintiffs alleged that the Texas Constitution requires the state to support a free public school system' and that the financing system established by the state denied them equal educational opportunity.!
On October 15, 1969, the three-judge federal court overruled the defendant's
motion to dismiss but delayed action on the case because revisions to the state's
system for financing schools were under consideration by the Texas Legislature.'
When the legislature failed to act, the action was resumed. Held, injunction
granted and order stayed: The Texas public school financing system, which
relies heavily on local property taxes and promotes substantial disparities
among school districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil, invidiously
discriminates against the poor and violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,
337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576
(U.S. June 6, 1972) (No. 1332).
I. THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEM

Over ninety percent of the funds for the support of Texas public schools
comes from local property taxes and aid from the state.! State aid consists of
funds from the Available School Fund and the Minimum Foundation Program.
The Available School Fund is allocated as a flat grant for each pupil in daily
attendance regardless of the district's income from other sources.6 The sources
of revenue for the Available School Fund are state-wide taxes and income from
the permanent school fund.
' The suit was filed as a class action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The plaintiffs also
represented all other children in Texas who live in school districts with low property
valuations.
3TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Although the Texas Constitution seems to create a right
to public education, the plaintiffs challenged the existing financing system under the federal
equal protection clause. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970).
'The plaintiffs alleged that the Texas school financing system denied them equal educational opportunity in that (1) it made the quality of education a function of the wealth
of the local school district; (2) it provided students, living in school districts other than
Edgewood, with material advantages for education; (3) it provided educational resources
which were substantially inferior to those received by children of similar age, aptitude, motivation, and ability in other school districts; (4) it perpetuated marked differences in the
quality of educational services; (5) it discriminated against Mexican-American school children.4
TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 16.711 (Supp. 1971) established the Governor's Committee on Public School Education to study the "apparent inequities in the allocation of
funds to be provided by local school districts" and to provide a solution to be implemented
in the 1970-1971 school year.
' Local property taxes produced approximately one-half of the state-local expenditure for
public schools. The federal government contributes the remaining 10% of the overall public
school expenditures. 1968-1969 TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, PUBLIC SCHOOL DIRECTORY
vol. 62, at 58-59.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. SS 15.01(b), (c) (Supp. 1971).
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The Minimum Foundation Program is designed to guarantee a minimum
expenditure per pupil throughout the state. The minimum foundation amount
for each district is calculated on the basis of professional salaries, operating
expenses, and transportation costs.! Eighty percent of this program is financed
by the state and the remaining twenty percent is allocated to the local districts
through the Local Fund Assignment.8 Each district's share of the Local Fund
Assignment is calculated from an economic index which is designed to measure
the taxpaying ability of the district.! If the sum of a district's share of the
Local Fund Assignment and per capita grant from the Available School Fund
is less than the amount necessary to support a Minimum Foundation Program
in the district, the state provides the additional funds necessary to reach the
foundation minimum.10
The local districts levy and collect property taxes on the property within
each district to provide the funds for the Local Fund Assignment, capital expenditures, and any expenditures beyond the state's minimum.11 Therefore, the
amount of revenue available from local sources depends on the property value
per pupil within a district and the district's tax effort measured by the tax rate.
In the seven San Antonio school districts the market value of property varied
from a low of $5,960 per student in Edgewood to a high of $49,478 per student in Alamo Heights.'" Although taxes as a percentage of the property's
market value were the highest in Edgewood and the lowest in Alamo Heights,
Edgewood produced only $21 per student from local ad valorem taxes while
the lower rate in Alamo Heights provided $307 per pupil." State financial
assistance did not equalize these disparities in educational expenditures. In the
1967-1968 school year the combined local-state expenditure in Edgewood was
$231 per student, while in Alamo Heights it was $543 per pupil." Since the
stated purpose of the foundation program was merely to guarantee a minimum
expenditure,"2 it did not even attempt to equalize educational expenditures
from district to district.
II.

CHALLENGES TO STATE SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEMS

The disparities in educational expenditures within the State of Texas are not
unique. Every school financing system in the United States except Hawaii"
7

Id. § 16.71.
81ld. § 16.72.
Old. §§ 16.74-.76. The economic index has been criticized. See GOVERNOR's COMM.
ON PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUC., THE CHALLENGE AND THE CHANCE 58-68 (1968).
'0 TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 16.79 (Supp. 1971).
"TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3; TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 20.01-.08 (Supp. 1971).
1 Plaintiff's Exhibit VIII, at 25, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F.
Supp. 280, 282 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June
6, 1972) (No. 1332).
"Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex.
1972), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 6, 1971) (No. 1332).
14 Id. With federal funds added to state-local funds the expenditure per pupil was $356
in Edgewood and $594 in Alamo Heights. 1967-1968 TEXAs EDUCATIONAL AGENCY,
PUBLIC SCHOOL DIRECTORY vol. 2, at 2, 4.
"5TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.01 (Supp. 1971).
"6Hawaii has a centralized system of school financing and administration which relies
primarily on statewide income, property, and excise taxes. See HAWAII REV. STAT. SS 296-1
to .48 (1968).
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relies to some extent on local property tax revenues. In Mclnnis v. Shapiro'
a group of Chicago students challenged the Illinois school financing system,
but the court dismissed the complaint, and the United States Supreme Court
summarily affirmed without oral argument."9 The court in Mclnnis stated that
"[ulnequal educational expenditures per student, based upon the variable
property values and tax rates of local school districts, do not amount to an
invidious discrimination."'" The court also emphasized that the concept of
spending according to educational needs did not provide judicially manageable
standards."0
The fate of the Illinois suit did not deter other challenges to state school
financing. In Burrus v. Wilkerson" a three-judge federal court, relying on McInnis, dismissed a challenge to the Virginia school financing system for lack
of judicially manageable standards." In Hargrave v. Kirk" the court held
that the Florida millage rollback statute' violated the equal protection clause
by preventing poorer counties from providing as good an education for their
children as richer counties." But the Hargrave court distinguished the holding
in Mclnnis on two grounds: (1) the plaintiffs in Hargrave did not challenge
the variations in per-pupil expenditures caused by differences in tax effort and
property values and (2) the remedy required only an injunction to prevent
state officials from withholding state funds from counties exceeding the ten
mill limit.' Therefore, Hargravewas considered an attack on only one segment
of Florida's school financing system.
In Serrano v. Priest" the California Supreme Court held that a complaint
" 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111.1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969). According to the court in McInnis, the plaintiffs contended that "only a
financing system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs of the
student satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 331. The court stated that the two primary reasons for dismissing the complaint were: "(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require that public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational
needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes this controversy nonjusticiable." Id. at 329.
"8A summary affirmance on an appeal from a decision of a three-judge federal court is
a decision on the merits entitled to precedential weight. See Barton v. Sentmer, 353 U.S. 963
(1957); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 197-99 (4th ed. 1969).
9
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
"The court called educational needs a "nebulous concept" which rendered the issue
nonjusticiable. Id. at 329 n.4.
"310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), af'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
"The plaintiffs in Burris relied on the educational needs standard that had been rejected
in Mclnnis. The court stated that "the courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means,
nor the power to tailor the public monies to fit the varying needs of ... students throughout
the state." Id. at 574.
2 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for two reasons:
(1) the district court should have abstained because of an intervening proceeding attacking
the law in the state court, and (2) the equal protection claim should have been decided
only4 after full hearing rather than as a summary judgment.
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (Supp. 1971) provided that any county imposing on
itself more than ten mills ad valorem tax for educational purposes would not be eligible to
receive state funds for support of its public schools.
"'The court applied the traditional equal protection test and held that the millage rollback statute was not rationally related to any permissible state purpose. Hargrave v. Kirk,
313 F. Supp. 944, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1970); see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 949 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
275 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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challenging the California school financing system stated a cause of action."
The court found that the level of educational expenditures within California
school districts depended primarily upon the wealth of each district. Therefore,
there were wide disparities in expenditures per pupil from district to district
within the state." The court rejected the state's contention that the equal protection clause does not require territorial uniformity,"0 and stated that "where
fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at stake, a state's general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis will be significantly curtailed by
the equal protection clause."'" The court concluded that no compelling state
interest"2 justified a classification based on wealth" affecting the fundamental
interest in education.'
Serrano was the first case to state expressly that education is a fundamental
interest for purposes of the "new" equal protection test. The court based its
decision on the importance of education to society and the individual. The
court also relied on the uniqueness of education in distinguishing it from other
governmental services? and compared education to the "fundamental interests"
in voting 7 and fair criminal procedure."
The California Supreme Court refused to be bound by the decision in McInnis. The court acknowledged that a summary affirmance was technically an
adjudication on the merits but suggested that in practice it was often equivalent
"The court upheld the complaint against a demurrer and returned the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
"See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592-95, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246-48, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 606-08 (1971).
"0This contention was based on a quotation from Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545,
551 (1954): "The Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such
rather than between areas."
"Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 612, 487 P.2d 1241, 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 621
(1971). See Horowitz & Nietring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 787 (1968).
" The court held that the state's interest in retaining local decision-making power and
local fiscal control was not sufficient to justify the present system. According to the court,
local decision-making power could remain under any new system. Furthermore, the present
system actually deprived the poor districts of local fiscal control because they were unable
to raise the necessary revenues even at high tax rates.
"The court held: (1) that a wealth classification does not have to be the product of
purposeful discrimination to be invalid; (2) that a wealth classification based on district
wealth is as unconstitutional as individual wealth classifications; and (3) that a de facto
wealth classification cannot be justified by analogy to de facto racial segregation.
'When a classification is based on suspect criteria or affects a "fundamental interest,"
the equal protection clause requires a "compelling state interest" to justify the classification.
Under the "new" equal protection test the courts generally find that no compelling state
interest exists or that less onerous alternatives are available. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
82 The court acknowledged that no direct authority supported the contention that education is a fundamental interest which may not be conditioned upon wealth. Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 604, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615 (1971).
"6Factors distinguishing education from other public services are: (1) the role of education in maintaining free enterprise democracy; (2) the universal relevance of education;
(3) the sustained, intensive contact between the state and the student; (4) the extent to
which education molds the personality of youth; and (5) the compulsory nature of education. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUcATION 414-19 (1970).
37Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

to a denial of certiorari." Furthermore, the court considered the plaintiff's
contentions significantly different from those in Mclnnis because the proposition
that education cannot be a function of wealth provided the judicially manageable standard that was lacking in the concept of spending according to educational needs.4"
A federal district court in Van Dusartz v.Hatfield1 relied on Serrano to
uphold a challenge to the Minnesota school financing system. The opinion in
Van Dusartz closely parallels Serrano, but the court expressly adopted the
concept of "fiscal neutrality" as a constitutional standard for school financing
systems. 2 The court stated the proposition that the quality of public education
"may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a
whole." The decisions in Serrano and Van Dusartz opened the door to a flood
of suits challenging state school financing systems."
III.

RODRIGUEZ V. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District' was the first case

to declare unequivocally a state school financing system unconstitutional because of the disparities in expenditures per pupil within the state. The opinion
in Rodriguez basically followed the reasoning employed in Serrano and Van
Dusartz.0 The court first analyzed the present Texas school financing system
and found that it promoted wide disparities in expenditures per pupil throughout the state. The court then held that use of the local school district as the
financing unit for public education constituted a wealth classification affecting
the fundamental interest in education. No compelling state interest was found
to justify such a wealth classification; therefore, the court adopted the proposition that the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth
other than the wealth of the state as a whole.
The court found that the disparities in educational expenditures existing
throughout Texas were the result of the differences in local district property
values. 7 State aid did not equalize expenditures within the state, and the court
pointed out that state funds actually subsidized the rich districts rather than
aiding the poor ones." The court cited two reasons for rejecting the contention
" Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 604, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 624
(1971). See note 18 supra.
'See notes 17-20 supra, and accompanying text.
41334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). The district court denied the state's motion to
dismiss but the plaintiffs later dismissed their suit without prejudice because the Minnesota
Legislature revised the school aid formula.
"J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 36, at 9, originated the concept
of fiscal neutrality as a constitutional standard for state school financing systems.
"Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971).
"For a listing of suits see LAWYER'S COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, LAW
SUITS CHALLENGING STATE SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEMS (Jan. 1971).
'337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), prob. juris, noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S.
June 6, 1972) (No. 1332).
4 The theory upon which these three suits were primarily based first appeared in Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969).
47See notes 5.15 supra, and accompanying text.
40 State funds subsidize rich school districts in at least two ways: (1)
The grants for
professional personnel are contingent on the actual employment of qualified personnel and
payment of a minimum salary. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.11(b), (c) (Supp.
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that the state may distribute state funds as it desires as long as federal financing
equalizes the differences. First, federal funds did not in fact compensate for the
differences caused by the state school financing system." Secondly, the state's
performance of its constitutional obligations must be judged by its own behavior rather than by the actions of the federal government."
The court held that the disparities in educational expenditures caused by
differences in local district property values constituted a classification based on
wealth. Although the court found a correlation between poor school districts
and low income families, 1 the decision relied on the relative wealth of the
district itself. The poverty of individuals within these poor districts only heightened the discrimination that the court found in the system. The court emphasized that the local school districts were created by the state and that the
manner of financing education was dictated by the state. Therefore, the poverty
of a governmental unit, rather than individual poverty, promoted this wealth
classification.
In Rodriguez the plaintiffs further alleged that the Texas school financing
system promoted a racial classification. Although the court recognized that poor
school districts contained a disproportionate number of minority students,"2
the court did not emphasize this correlation or rely on it to support the decision.
Apparently the court recognized that minorities are affected by the disparities
in educational expenditures because of their poverty rather than any racial
discrimination inherent in the financing system.
The Rodriguez court indicated that strict scrutiny of the Texas school financing system could be based solely on the existence of a wealth classification.
In McDonald v. Board of Elections" the Supreme Court stated that lines
"drawn on the basis of wealth ... would independently render a classification

highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." The
phrase "classification on the basis of wealth" is misleading because it conceivably includes the denial of any goods or services because of the inability to
pay. Although an express wealth classification would probably be held unconstitutional, 4 a de facto wealth classification has been held unconstitutional
1971). Therefore, districts with the financial ability to employ their entire allotment of personnel are subsidized; (2) The flat per capita grant from the Available School Fund provides a bonus for rich districts which would not otherwise qualify for state aid under the
minimum
foundation program.
49
See note 14 supra.
" The court relied on cases holding that the federal aid is intended as special assistance
and to permit a reduction in state aid would violate congressional intent. See, e.g., Triplett
v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Neb. 1969). However, these decisions relicd on the
supremacy clause rather than on equal protection. See Carlsbad Union School Dist. v.
Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969), a/I'd, 429 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1970), in
which the court rejected an equal protection challenge to the reduction of state aid.
"' The court noted that in 1960, the median family income in districts with high property
values per pupil was $5,900, while in the districts with low per-pupil values there was a
$3,325 median family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282 n.3. Serrano and Van Dusartz did not
rely on such a correlation.
5 Plaintiff's Exhibit VIII, at 6, 337 F. Supp. at 282 n.3, showed that 10 districts with
market value of taxable property per pupil above $100,000 had 8% minority pupils, while
the 4 districts with market value of taxable property per pupil below $10,000 had 79%
minority pupils.
53394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
' Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 20-27 (1967). An express
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only when it adversely affected a fundamental interest."
The Texas school financing system does not expressly classify on the basis of
wealth. The differences in property values among the school districts created
a de facto wealth classification based on the ability of each district to pay for
education. Such de facto wealth classification will continue as long as income or
property value differences exist. Thus far the courts have not attempted to
correct the results of wealth disparities unless other factors required strict
scrutiny."
However, the court held that education is a fundamental interest which
cannot be conditioned upon wealth. The court relied on Brown v. Board of
7
Education"
to establish education as a fundamental interest. But the decision
in Brown and others in the field of school desegregation have been thought
to be controlled by the racial discrimination involved, rather than the fundamental nature of education." By establishing education as a fundamental interest under equal protection, the court extended the inner circle of protected
interests.
The court in Rodriguez stated that the importance of education both to the
individual and to society established education as a fundamental interest. The
extensive impact of education on the political, social, and economic life of an
individual and the society in which he lives is evident, but the importance of
an interest is not necessarily sufficient to require strict scrutiny." Admitting
wealth classification would exist if the state prohibited all children from low income families from attending Alamo Heights' schools. But an express geographical classification does
exist in the form of local school districts. This geographical classification in reality creates
a wealth classification similar to de facto racial segregation.
"See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). A de facto wealth classification exists whenever goods and services are provided according to an individual's ability
to pay.
" Factors requiring strict scrutiny of a wealth classification affecting education include
the importance of education, the extent that the government has created district wealth
differences through zoning and drawing district boundaries, and the role of the state as
the seller of public education.
57 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The statement in Brown which the court relied on was:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
Id. at 493.
" In subsequent per curiam decisions citing Brown, the Supreme Court ruled racial
segregation invalid in golf courses, bathhouses, and motor buses without attempting to
evaluate the interest involved. See, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S.
971 (1954). See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065,
1089 (1969).
"Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The Court upheld a state statute fixing
a maximum on Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC payments). The plaintiffs
contended that the statute discriminated against large families in the provision of basic
subsistence. The court acknowledged that "the administration of public welfare . . . involves
the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings" but applied the traditional
test under equal protection. Id. at 485. However, the decision in Dandridge could be based
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education to the inner circle of protected interests represents a significant extension of the definition of a fundamental interest. Proponents of the "new"
equal protection test reject any "a priori definition of a 'right' fundamental or
otherwise," and support a weighing of competing interests under equal protection."0 The interest in education would probably satisfy such a weighing test
even though distinguishable from other interests held to be fundamental under
the standard of equal protection."' If education qualifies as a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned upon payment, the term could conceivably
be expanded to encompass all public services which are presently provided
through local financing. "2
Accepting education as a fundamental interest, the court demanded that the
state demonstrate a compelling interest to justify a wealth classification affecting
education. The court rejected the state's interest in local decision-making and
fiscal control on the same basis as in Serrano," and held that the state's interest
can be achieved through alternatives that do not involve a classification based
on wealth.
The court ordered the abolition of the existing Texas school financing system
but stayed the order for two years to allow the legislature to formulate a new
school financing system. The court emphasized that the primary job of formulating a new program rests with the legislature rather than with the courts.
The only requirement is that the program adopted does not make the quality
of public education a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole. The court seemed to consider the latitude of this proposition as a
virtue which would allow the legislature flexibility in formulating a new school
financing system. According to the court, this proposition also provides a judicially manageable standard against which any new program of school financing can be measured. 4
IV. CONCLUSION

No one could deny that disparities in educational expenditures exist within
the state of Texas and that the primary cause of these differences is the variation
in property values among the districts. However, if no public schools existed,
the financing unit for education would be the family, and the expenditure on
on the absence of any suspect classification rather than the absence of a fundamental interest.
See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
"5Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
"[C]oncentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to the individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interest in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21.
61One basic characteristic separates education from those interests which have been held
to be fundamental under equal protection: Public education, unlike voting, fair criminal
procedure, and interstate mobility, is not essential to the functioning of the federal system
or a "penumbra" of other constitutional rights. See Brest, Interdistrict Disparities in Education Resources, 23 SWAN. L. REV. 591, 614 (1971).
61But see note 36 supra.
63 See note 32 supra.
'The court distinguished Mclnnis on the basis of the different judicial standards available. See notes 17-20 supra, and accompanying text. The court maintained that the judiciary
can always determine that an act of the legislature violates the Constitution and that, therefore, it was not acting as a "super legislature."
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education would depend on the ability of the family to pay. The existing school
financing system shifts the financing burden to the local school district and
guarantees a minimum educational expenditure to each pupil. Therefore, the
issue in Rodriguez is whether the Constitution requires the state to go further
and correct the disparities which result from reliance on the local school district as the financing unit for public education.
The court convincingly brings the existing school financing system within
the prohibition of the equal protection clause by applying strict scrutiny to a
suspect classification affecting a fundamental interest. However, the uncertainty
of the terms "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest" supports the
charge that the new equal protection test merely represents a return to a natural
law Constitution." The conclusion that education is a fundamental interest
under equal protection is the cornerstone of the decision in Rodriguez, but this
conclusion seems to rest on the sensibilities of the court rather than on the
dictates of the Constitution. Therefore, criticism of the decision is basically a
criticism of the "new" equal protection.
In declaring the existing school financing system unconstitutional, the court
adopted the concept of fiscal neutrality as a constitutional standard for the
legislature to follow in formulating a new school financing program. According to the originators of fiscal neutrality, the property tax could still be utilized
as a tool of public school financing, " but since the court did not set rigid
guidelines for interpreting the proposition that public education cannot be a
function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole, several
different financing plans could possibly qualify."
The most obvious legislative response to the decision in Rodriguez would be
to require equal expenditures per pupil throughout the state. Although such
a program would not violate the basic concept of fiscal neutrality, it is not
necessarily required by the decision. Furthermore, equal expenditures would
actually promote inequality in educational opportunity because the cost of
providing equivalent schooling varies among schools and school districts. A
variant of the equal expenditure proposal would merely raise the minimum to
a higher level and continue to allow local districts to supplement the statewide
minimum. But such a system would violate the strict concept of fiscal neutrality
even though it reduced the magnitude of disparities in educational expenditures."6 Another apparent solution would be to redraw local school district
65

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969)
COONS, W. CLUNE & S.

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

SUGARMAN, supra note 36, at 163-65.
67Interpreted literally, the concept of fiscal neutrality condemns only wealth-related dis66j.

parities in educational expenditures. In formulating a new financing system, the legislature
must only avoid disparities caused by the differences in wealth. Therefore, the decision does
not guarantee "equal learning opportunity" throughout the state. See Silard & White,
Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 7.
"6The existing school financing system was held unconstitutional because it allowed the
wealthy to transfer the advantages of wealth to their children through higher quality public
schools. The wealthy can continue to provide better educations for their children through
private schools, but Rodriguez negates the private school attitude toward public education.
Therefore, if the courts strictly adhere to the concept of fiscal neutrality, any system that
allows local districts of varying wealth to supplement the state minimum would be held
unconstitutional. It is highly unlikely that the state minimum could be set so high that the
richer districts would not want to supplement state funds.
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boundary lines to achieve equal property values per pupil throughout the state.
The school districts would thus retain local decision-making power and fiscal
control but the difficulties of valuation and continual adjustment would be
overwhelming.
The concept of "power equalizing" would retain local decision-making and
fiscal control and also satisfy the requirements of fiscal neutrality. District
power equalizing would allow differing levels of educational expenditure depending on the district's interest in education rather than wealth.69 However,
such a system would not guarantee equal educational opportunity and could
actually cause a reduction in statewide support for public education."0 Furthermore, the practical implementation of power equalizing in school financing
has not been tested.
Another system that would achieve fiscal neutrality would require statewide
centralization of public school financing.' Despite the fact that centralization
conflicts with the tradition of local control over public schools, this could
be remedied by allowing local control over the actual use of the funds. However, the local school districts would not be allowed to determine the level of
educational expenditures. The decision in Rodriguez did not declare local control over the level of educational expenditures unconstitutional unless it caused
wealth-related disparities. Therefore, differences in educational expenditures
caused by factors other than wealth would not violate the concept of fiscal
neutrality."2 Notwithstanding this legal subtlety, centralization probably represents the most pragmatic method to achieve fiscal neutrality and preserve the
public school system.
The decision in Rodriguez thrusts the courts into an area traditionally reserved to legislative action. The willingness of the courts to supervise extensive
reforms in the school desegregation and reapportionment areas indicates that
the courts will rarely abstain from an issue because of the difficulty of enforcement. Nevertheless, the proposition that the quality of public education cannot
be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole provides a
simplistic answer to a complex problem. Although the constitutional challenge
" Under a system of district power equalizing, the local school districts would retain
control over the amount of funds to be spent for education, but the level of expenditures
would be a function of the tax effort alone. For example, the legislature could develop a
table specifying the per-pupil expenditure permitted at differing levels of tax effort. If two
districts were taxed at the same rate, they would be permitted to spend the same amount
per pupil regardless of the wealth of the districts. This plan would probably require the
redistribution of excess local collections from rich districts and the subsidy of poor districts,
but the districts could retain local decision-making power and fiscal control. See J. CooNs,
W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 36, at 201-42.
" If the wealthy are not permitted to provide higher quality educations for their children
in the public schools at low tax rates, they will likely flee to private schools. Taxpayers
without children and those with children in private schools would not want to vote for higher tax rates, especially where much of the revenue will be spent outside of the local school
district. Even the poor districts might not vote for the higher tax rates necessary to obtain
higher expenditures because of ignorance or low valuation of education.
71Centralized financing would satisfy fiscal neutrality only if it were a bona fide effort
to provide substantially equivalent educational opportunity for all school children. The state
could allocate funds according to the educational needs of each school based on factors similar
to those employed by the existing minimum foundation program. See note 7 supra, and
accompanying text. Such a system would require substantial administrative discretion at the
state level to provide flexibility.
7 See note 69 supra, and acompanying text.

